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In this paper, using recent empirical results regarding the statistical properties
of macroeconomic data revisions, we study the e⁄ects of data revisions in a general
equilibrium framework. We ￿nd that the presence of data revisions, or data uncertainty,
creates a precautionary motive and causes signi￿cant changes in the decisions of agents.
We also ￿nd that the model with revisions captures some aspects of the business cycle
dynamics of the US data better than the benchmark model with no revisions. Using our
model we measure the cost of having data revisions to be about $33 billion, $5 billion of
which can be recovered by eliminating the predictability of revisions. Comparing these
numbers with the budgets of the major statistical agencies in the US, we conclude that
any money spent on the improvement of data collection would be well worth it.
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11 Introduction
Macroeconomic data are subject to continuous revisions. In an e⁄ort to generate timely data,
statistical agencies produce estimates using limited information before they have access to
a larger information set. The arrival of new data necessitates often substantial revisions to
these initial estimates, sometimes changing the outlook of the economy. These revisions can
be considered the symptoms of the underlying data uncertainty, the uncertainty that stems
from the fact that the current state of the world cannot be perfectly observed. A rational
decision-maker recognizes the existence of data uncertainty and does not take announcements
at their face value. As such, his decisions will be di⁄erent from those made under no data
uncertainty, and there will be welfare consequences.
In this paper we analyze how decisions change in a general equilibrium model in the pres-
ence of revisions, and more importantly, we evaluate the welfare consequences of revisions.
Our results indicate that revisions to macroeconomic data in the US are not only large in a
statistical sense but are also economically important, signi￿cantly altering the decisions of
agents and thereby leading to sizeable welfare consequences.
Revisions to macroeconomic data are well understood by economists and have been stud-
ied for decades. One of the early examples is Stekler￿ s (1962) analysis of the usefulness of
initial data releases for economic analysis. Howrey (1978) considers improving the perfor-
mance of forecasting models by explicitly using the fact that preliminary data is revised.
More recently Croushore and Stark (1999, 2001) show that data vintages are important and
that results from empirical analysis can change, often drastically, when di⁄erent vintages are
used.
All the literature cited so far focus on the size of data revisions or data uncertainty.
A natural next step is to analyze the statistical properties of data revisions. One of the
interesting dimensions to consider is the predictability of data revisions. Mankiw et al.
(1984) and Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) ￿nd that the revisions to GNP can be considered
to be rational forecast errors, while revisions to money stock data are predictable. In a
recent paper, Faust et al. (2003) examine the revisions to the GDP growth rates for the
G-7 countries and ￿nd that while for the US revisions are slightly predictable, for Italy,
Japan, and the UK, about half the variability of subsequent revisions can be accounted for
by information available at the time of the preliminary announcements.
2Despite all the interest in the statistical properties of data revisions, there is hardly any
work analyzing their e⁄ects on decisions and their welfare implications. In this paper we aim
to ￿ll this gap by using a dynamic general equilibrium model that includes data uncertainty.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, we summarize some of the statistical properties of revisions
which show the extent of data uncertainty. Our results show that over the last 30 years,
data revisions have been large and, more importantly, predictable. There is also evidence
that the initial announcements by the statistical agencies have been biased. We also provide
some evidence from a survey of professional forecasts that shows they seem to ignore this
bias and predictability. These empirical observations will be the basis of our model.
There are a number of previous studies that allow for noisy indicators in their models.
In one of the earliest examples, Kydland and Prescott (1982) introduce a white noise mea-
surement error for productivity in their model that is used to explain the business cycle
dynamics of the US. However, the measurement error does not play a central role in their
analysis. A recent paper by Bom￿m (2001) considers the e⁄ects of white noise measurement
errors on business cycle dynamics using a similar model. Both of these papers assume that
revisions are unpredictable, zero-mean measurement errors. Our empirical evidence suggests
that this may not be the right way to characterize data revisions.
In this paper we use a variant of the neoclassical stochastic growth model in which the
agents do not observe true productivity before making their decisions. Instead, they observe
an announcement about true productivity by a statistical agency. Unlike earlier papers we
calibrate the revision process in the model using a measure we derive from the data, which
enables us to use the model to measure the e⁄ects of data revisions.
The results of the model show important changes in the behavior of agents when they
face data uncertainty. In particular, we ￿nd that the agents￿optimal response to observed
productivity shocks are less extreme for consumption, compared to the case with no data
uncertainty. Since the agent knows that the signals he observes might be wrong, he chooses
to respond to only a fraction of them. On the other hand, when faced with a positive pro-
ductivity shock, the agent wants to save more than he would if he knew the true productivity
shock. All these changes in decisions can be considered the results of a precautionary motive
due to data uncertainty. The business cycle dynamics of the model also change with the
introduction of data revisions. We ￿nd that in the dimensions that the model without revi-
sions fails to match the observations from the US data, the model with revisions performs
3no worse. However, the model with revisions better captures some aspects of the data, such
as volatility of output and labor, and contemporaneous correlation of variables with output.
The last part of the paper attempts to provide a cost-bene￿t analysis for data collection.
Sims (1985) emphasizes the di¢ culties in applying traditional cost-bene￿t analysis to data
collection. Identifying who obtains and bene￿ts from the data is almost impossible. More-
over, measuring the value of the data to those who bene￿t from it is di¢ cult, since it requires
identifying what their decisions would have been in the absence of the data in question. We
are able to address these issues in the framework of our model, since it allows us to measure
precisely how much agents bene￿t from the data.
We ￿nd that the existence of revisions, or equivalently not being able to observe the
current state of the world, is costly for the agents, around 0.47% of consumption every period.
This cost is computed by comparing the welfare in a model with revisions, calibrated to the
US data, to a model with no revisions. Due to the timeliness-accuracy trade-o⁄, there will
always be some revisions, and thus it is not realistic to expect this cost to be reduced to
zero. But to the extent that the predictability of revisions reduce welfare, it may be possible
to regain some of this loss by eliminating this predictability. We compute the welfare gain
of such a policy to be about 0.08% of consumption. Although it is not possible to compute
the cost of implementing such a policy, the monetary value of this gain is about four times
the budgets of major statistical agencies in the US. This implies that any money spent on
reducing the predictability of data revisions documented in this paper would be worth it. We
also compute the bene￿t of having data announcements to be 0.03% of consumption every
period, which is about twice the cost of producing the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our empirical ￿ndings regarding
the bias and predictability of revisions. In Section 3, we develop a static model of labor supply
with revisions. This section shows the e⁄ect of revisions in a simple model. In Section 4, we
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with revisions. We use this model to measure
the quantitative e⁄ects of revisions. Section 5 concludes. Further details about the data used,
numerical solution methods, and proofs of claims and propositions are in the Appendix.
42 Statistical Properties of Data Revisions
In Aruoba (2004), we conducted an empirical analysis of data revisions an showed that

























t is the ￿nal revision of a variable and It+1 is the information set at the time of the
initial announcement of the variable. In the Introduction, we de￿ned data uncertainty as
the uncertainty that arises when we cannot observe the correct state of the world perfectly.
Since r
f
t is the di⁄erence between the true state of the world and the announcement by the
statistical agency, we can characterize data uncertainty with the variance of r
f
t : Similarly
when (P3) does not hold, the R2 of the projection of r
f
t on to It+1 can be used to characterize
the level of predictability of revisions.
Before we turn to the models, we summarize our ￿ndings from Aruoba (2004). Our
analysis covers 22 variables which include key variables such as real output growth, labor
productivity growth, capacity utilization and in￿ ation over the period 1966-2000. Our ￿nd-
ings are:
￿ The means of ￿nal revisions for all variables we consider are positive and all but four
of them are statistically di⁄erent from zero. In other words, we have signi￿cant evi-
dence against (P1): This means that the initial announcements of statistical agencies
regarding these variables are biased downwards.
￿ Final revisions are statistically large, measured by the noise-to-signal ratios, and there-
fore (P2) is not supported by the data.
￿ In an ex post forecasting exercise, there are signi￿cant gains over a zero forecast which
would be correct if (P3) was true. These gains can also be exploited in real time for a
number of variables using a very simple forecasting rule.
￿ Results from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) suggest that a vast majority
of the forecasters choose not to update the initial announcement of the statistical
5agency, which implies that they believe that (P1); (P2) and (P3) are true.
In this paper, our main focus will be (P2) and (P3) and we will use the observation
from SPF for modeling agent￿ s perceptions of revisions in the model. We do not consider
the e⁄ects of the bias of the initial announcements of the statistical agencies since doing so
requires departure from rationality, which we avoid in this paper. In other words, the agents
in our model will know about the non-zero mean revision and adjust the announcements
they see from the statistical agency.
In the next section, we construct a simple model with revisions to highlight how revisions
may e⁄ect the decision making process of agents. We then build a dynamic general equilib-
rium model to quantify these e⁄ects. In particular, we measure the welfare consequences of
data uncertainty and the predictability of revisions we summarized in this section.
3 A Static Model of Labor Supply with Revisions
In this section we consider a static model with revisions. This model will set the stage for
the notation and, more importantly, provide the intuition for the results we get in the next
section, where we develop the full dynamic model. In particular, we show that when faced
with uncertainty about the state of the world, the agents respond less to the signals they
observe. Moreover, we show why a welfare measure that condition on the observed states
may be misleading and we develop the measure of welfare that is used throughout the paper.
We consider the labor supply decision problem of an agent who faces uncertainty about
the state of the world (level of productivity) solved by a social planner. In this model,
true productivity, Af; takes one of two possible values, d or ￿d; which we refer to as high
and low productivity, respectively.1 Without loss of generality, we assume both states of
the world are equally likely. Instead of observing Af directly, the agent observes Ao; which
is a correct signal with probability p; where p > 1=2 by assumption.2 Formally, we have
p ￿ Pr
￿




Af = AjAo = A
￿
where the second equality follows from
Bayes￿Theorem.
1We assume that d 2 (0;1); which makes the problem well-de￿ned, as will become clear below.
2When p < 1=2; we can re-write the problem when Ao = d; for example, as the agent observing Ao = ￿d
with the probability of observing Af correctly given by 1￿p: In other words, the problem will be symmetric
around p = 1=2 with both p = 1 and p = 0 corresponding to the case of certainty.
6The social planner maximizes the agent￿ s utility
max
c;h
E log(c) + log(1 ￿ h) (1)
subject to a trivial resource constraint c = y where output follows
y = f(h) = A
f + h (2)
and the constraints c ￿ 0 and h 2 [0;1]:
Clearly, f (h) is not a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) production function. We use this
production function to make sure Af a⁄ects the decisions of the agent in a problem with
a tractable solution. If we use a production function of the form Afh￿; for example, the
objective function of the agent would be log
￿
Af￿
+log(h￿)+log(1 ￿ h); in which case the
solution to this problem would be independent of Af: In the dynamic model we develop in
the next section, the existence of capital eliminates this issue, and we use a CRS production
function.
We can write the value function of the agent as follows, being explicit about the expec-















log[￿d + h] + log(1 ￿ h)g
where the ￿rst term is the utility of consumption when the true shock is d; the second term
is the utility of consumption when the true shock is ￿d; and the last term is the disutility
of labor. All probabilities are conditional on the observation Ao.
3.1 Solution with No Uncertainty
First we solve the problem in (3) when p = 1; which corresponds to the case of no uncertainty,
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which satis￿es h 2 [0;1] as long as d 2 (￿1;1): We use the superscript B to re￿ ect the







which always satis￿es c ￿ 0:
In this simple model, the income e⁄ect due to the increase in Af dominates the substitu-
tion e⁄ect.3 The solution for hB shows that the social planner wants to smooth consumption
for the agent across the states of the world.4 We can see this by recognizing that as Ao
(and therefore Af; in this case) goes down, the optimal labor supply goes up, stabilizing
consumption in bad states of the world.
3.2 Solution with Uncertainty
When p < 1; the social planner considers the possibility that the observation of productivity
may be wrong. The objective function becomes
V ( d) = max
h
fplog( d + h) + (1 ￿ p)log(￿d + h) + log(1 ￿ h)g (6)
V (￿d) = max
h
fplog(￿d + h) + (1 ￿ p)log( d + h) + log(1 ￿ h)g (7)
where we have taken conditional expectations based on the observed value, subject to
h 2 [0;1] and c ￿ 0
which reduces to
h 2 (d;1]
since nonnegativity of consumption implies d + h ￿ 0 and ￿d + h ￿ 0.
3In fact, since the real wage is constant, there is no substitution e⁄ect.
4The term ￿consumption smoothing￿is used in a di⁄erent way than its more familiar usage in a dynamic
model where it means consumption changing smoothly over time. A smooth consumption over time means a
lower variance. Here, since we have a static model, consumption smoothing refers to a lower variance across
the states of the world.
8Ignoring the constraints for now, when Ao = d; the optimal labor supply, given by














where the superscript R is used the re￿ ect the economy with ￿revisions￿ . When Ao = ￿d;















Note that the social planner chooses labor supply, considering a distribution of possible
consumption values, and the realized consumption depends on the true productivity shock,
following (2).
These two equations, along with the appropriate second order conditions, characterize
the unique solutions to each problem, as long as constraints are not violated. Below we
summarize some of the important observations from this model. We provide the solution of
the model and the proofs of the claims in Appendix B.
Claim 1 When p < 1; we have the following relationship among optimal decisions for h
h
B (d) < h
R (d) < h
R (￿d) < h
B (￿d)
This result has two implications. First, even when p < 1; the social planner wants to
smooth consumption for the agent by choosing hR (d) < hR (￿d): Second, since there is a
chance that the observed signal may be wrong, he chooses less extreme actions compared
to the p = 1 case, i.e. hB (d) < hR (d) and hR (￿d) < hB (￿d): This can be labeled as
a precautionary motive since recognizing the risk of incorrectly observing productivity, the
social planner chooses an action not as extreme as it would have been, had he observed the
true productivity. In other words, the social planner responds to the signals he observes less
than he would if he knew that the signals were correct. Clearly, the precautionary motive
and the consumption smoothing motive work in opposite directions, the former reducing the
variance of decisions across states and the latter increasing the variance across states.
9Claim 2 When p < 1; the variance of the labor supply decisions over states decreases as the
level of uncertainty rises, while the variance of realized consumption over states increases.
We explained the ￿rst part of the claim above. The second part, i.e. the variance of
consumption increasing, results directly from the ￿rst part. The only tool that the social
planner has to smooth consumption over states is the labor supply decision. If, in the
presence of other motives, he chooses a smoother labor supply, it will lead to more volatile
consumption.
3.3 Welfare Comparisons
The ultimate goal of this paper is to compute the welfare consequences of data revisions. In
the next section, we use a calibrated, dynamic general equilibrium model for this purpose.
In this section we de￿ne the welfare measure we use in the context of the simple model and
explain why using the value function V (Ao) for this purpose might not be a good idea.
Claim 3 V R (d) < V B (d) and V R (￿d) > V B (￿d)
The interpretation of this result is that when the observed state of the world is high,
then the agent in the benchmark economy feels better o⁄ than his counterpart in the re-
vision economy, but when the observed state is low, this is reversed. This result sounds
counterintuitive at ￿rst since it implies that an agent with more information can be worse
o⁄. However, the critical point is that V (:) has the observed state of the world as its argu-
ment, and the expectations condition on that. This is why the welfare calculations based on
V (:) can be misleading. Thus, we need a welfare measure that conditions on the true states
of the world instead of the observed states.





















where the expectation is now taken with respect to Ao; conditioning on Af: Note that when
p = 1; ^ V R (A) = V B (A); since the expectation becomes trivial as Af = Ao: This suggests
that when p < 1, we can interpret ^ V R (:) as the value of the objective function of the agent
in the benchmark model, evaluated at the decision rules of the agent who faces revisions.
10This interpretation makes welfare comparisons well-de￿ned since we evaluate the decisions
of the agents in the two models in the same true state of the world.
Proposition 1 For all states of the world Af, V B ￿
Af￿
￿ ^ V R ￿
Af￿
; and when p < 1;
V B ￿
Af￿
> ^ V R ￿
Af￿
:
The formal proof of the theorem is in Appendix B. The result is a straightforward appli-
cation of Blackwell￿ s Theorem (Blackwell, 1951, 1953) which states that an expected utility
maximizer would prefer a larger information set. In our framework, Blackwell￿ s Theorem
implies that the agent in the benchmark economy, who has access to a larger information
set containing the true level productivity and the signal, must do better than the agent in
the revision economy who observes only the signal.
3.4 Summary of Results
We conclude this section by summarizing our ￿ndings from the simple model.
￿ Optimal labor supply increases as the true productivity shock declines. This can be
viewed as an e⁄ort to stabilize consumption over states.
￿ In the presence of uncertainty about the true state of the world (data uncertainty), the
social planner does not respond to the signals he observes as much as he would, had
he observed the true productivity, an action which can be labeled as a precautionary
behavior.
￿ Consumption is not chosen by the social planner but it follows from the resource
constraint. Since the labor supply decision is less extreme in the presence of data
uncertainty, consumption becomes more extreme.
￿ Welfare should be compared conditioning on the true states of the world.
In the next section, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with data revisions.
We use this model as a measurement tool to assess the welfare implications of data revisions.
114 A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with
Revisions
In this section we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents face data
uncertainty. We use this model to measure the welfare implications of data revisions and to
analyze how the decision making behavior of the agents in the economy changes when faced
with revisions.
Our model is a variant of the neoclassical growth model, which is used extensively in the
literature and can be considered the workhorse of modern macroeconomics. The model we
present in this section, unlike the model in the previous section, is a dynamic model. We use
a dynamic model in order to have a role for capital, an element crucial for matching some
of the business cycle facts we observe in the data.5
4.1 Environment
4.1.1 Endowments, Preferences, and Technology
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a continuum of identical agents whose
measure is normalized to one. Since all agents are identical, we can consider the problem of






where ct is consumption, lt is leisure, ￿ is the discount factor, and E0 is the expectation
operator that conditions on the information at time 0: The instantaneous utility function
u(:) is increasing, continuously di⁄erentiable, and strictly concave in both arguments.
The agent is endowed with one unit of time every period and an initial capital stock,
given by k0: He supplies labor, ht; and rents his capital, kt; to competitive ￿rms, and in
return he receives wage and rental payments, given by Wt and Rt per unit, which he takes
as given. These factor payments are allocated between investment to augment his capital
5Speci￿cally, the existence of capital (and thus investment) makes labor supply procyclical in contrast
to a model without capital where the labor supply is, counterfactually, acyclical.
12stock, it; and consumption. The budget constraint of the agent is thus given by
ct + it = Wtht + Rtkt
Capital depreciates at rate ￿; and the law of motion for the agent￿ s capital holdings is given
by
kt+1 = it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt
The output in the economy is produced by many identical competitive ￿rms who have








where Ht and Kt are aggregate labor and capital, respectively, and Yt is aggregate output.
The function F (:) is increasing and concave in both arguments. A
f
t is the natural logarithm
of the technological shock, and we use the f superscript to denote the true or the fundamental
value of the shock.6
4.1.2 Stochastic Environment
The only source of uncertainty in the model is technological progress which a⁄ects produc-
tion. The true technology shock is assumed to be persistent and its law of motion can be





t + "t+1 (9)













" is the variance of "t:
We specify the process for "t in a slightly non-standard way (with a non-zero mean)
6In the rest of the paper, we refer to A
f
t as the technology shock, keeping in mind that what enters the







13to make sure that changes in ￿2







:7 This is important for our analysis since we change some of the variance
parameters in our experiments, and we want to make sure we are not distorting the results
by changing means.8
So far, the model is exactly like the standard growth model. The crucial di⁄erence comes
from what the agents get to observe when they make their decisions. As in the simple
model in the previous section, the agents observe an announcement by a statistical agency
about today￿ s productivity, Ao
t; but they do not observe the level of true productivity before
they make their decisions. Therefore we add a new layer of uncertainty, the uncertainty
about today￿ s productivity, in addition to the uncertainty about future productivity, which
is standard.





t + rt (11)












r is the variance of rt and ￿ governs the mean of the revision. Similar to the mean
of "t discussed above, we assume that even when ￿ is zero, rt has a non-zero mean. This will
ensure that when we change ￿2
r in our experiments, the mean of exp(rt) does not change.9
Even though we allow for an unconditional mean of revisions, this will be inconsequential as
far as agents￿decisions are concerned. As long as agents are fully rational, which is the case
in this model, they will adjust all the announcements they see by the unconditional mean of
revisions and their decisions will be una⁄ected.
We make two modeling choices regarding the revision process. The ￿rst is the normality
7Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971)







is equal to unity and therefore changing ￿2
" is a mean-preserving spread.








When we compute the mean of exp(rt) with this speci￿cation, it is equal to exp(￿) which is very close to
1 + ￿; when ￿ is small.
14assumption which will be justi￿ed when we calibrate the revision process in Section 4.3.2
using real data. The second choice is that we model revisions as independent processes across
time. This assumption seems to contradict the empirical evidence regarding the persistence
and predictability of revisions we presented in Aruoba (2004). However, we can justify this
by the following argument. Suppose rt = ^ rt + ￿t; where ^ rt and ￿t are the predictable and
unpredictable parts of the revision, respectively, and ^ rt comes from a forecasting equation.
The representative agent is ultimately interested in forecasting A
f
t; and this decomposition
of rt is irrelevant for him. We can think of a new announcement ~ Ao
t = Ao
t + ^ rt and the new
implied revision is ￿t; which is by de￿nition an independent process. Therefore, we assume
that the announcement Ao
t contains all the information that can be extracted from the
information in the economy (including the information that might help to forecast revisions),
and the di⁄erence between A
f
t and Ao
t is orthogonal to everything in the economy. In other
words, the agent does not try to forecast the revisions since he thinks that he is facing iid
revisions. This setup is in line with the evidence from SPF that we summarized in Section
2, which suggests that agents believe they cannot forecast revisions.10
When ￿ = 0 and ￿2




t: We label this model as the benchmark model since in this case today￿ s productivity
is no longer uncertain, and we are back in the standard neoclassical growth model.
4.1.3 The Filtering Problem of the Agent
Every period the agent faces a non-trivial ￿ltering problem. Given Ao
t and the whole history








; he has to forecast the true technol-






















: We assume that the agent uses the Kalman
Filter to ￿nd the best linear forecast of these objects. Speci￿cally, at period t he considers
10Below, when we want to analyze the case where revisions are predictable, we use a similar argument
that relates predictability to change in variance of rt:




















































where we only include A
f
t￿1 and Ao
t in the state vector due to the Markovian structure of




t+1 can be obtained using the
































To ease notation, we de￿ne the ￿ltered signal as
^ At = w￿A
f
t￿1 + (1 ￿ w)A
o
t
and use it as the state variable of the agent since it gives the agent all the information he










t+1 ￿ ￿ ^ At = ￿[w"t + (1 ￿ w)rt] + "t+1 = ￿￿
1
t + "t+1
11Since the Kalman Filter gives the best linear forecast, we can also solve the following simpler forecast






















var[w"t + (1 ￿ w)rt]





16and the law of motion of ^ At is given by






t = w￿"t + (1 ￿ w)[￿rt ￿ rt+1 + "t+1]
At ￿rst glance ￿3
t seems to be autocorrelated due to the existence of multiple lags of "t and
rt. However, ￿3












" ￿ (1 ￿ w)
2 ￿￿2
r = 0 for k = 1
0 for k > 1
where the results for k = 1 follows by substituting the de￿nition of w from (12).
4.1.4 Timing
In the standard growth model, the agents begin the period by observing the productivity
shock for the period and use this information along with other state variables to choose labor,
investment, and consumption. Since all decisions are made using the same information set,
the ordering of the decisions is irrelevant.
The timing of events for the present paper, shown in Figure 4.1, can be summarized as
follows:
￿ The agent starts period t knowing kt; which he chose last period.
￿ The statistical agency collects all the information that helps it to forecast A
f
t and
makes an announcement, given by Ao
t: The information set it uses, It, contains last
period￿ s true productivity shock, A
f
t￿1; among other things.12
￿ Having observed kt, Ao
t and A
f
t￿1; the agent chooses his labor supply and his consump-
tion.
12We do not model explicitly the way the statistical agency makes its forecasts. We assume that since its
information set contains A
f
t￿1; the forecast error cannot have a variance greater than ￿2
"; as explained in the
previous section.
17￿ Production takes place and the agent receives factor payments. This reveals the true
level of productivity.
￿ Investment follows from the agent￿ s budget constraint.
Note that when we let the statistical agency have A
f




and we are in the benchmark model.
Clearly, once we let a subset of the decisions the agents make depend only on the signal
and not on the true level of productivity, there are several variations in timing that one
could adopt. The only constraint is that we must let either consumption or investment
be the residual to maintain budget balance. Also, having the labor supply decision at the
beginning of the period is more sensible. Subject to these two considerations, there are
two other timings one can adopt. We can switch the places of consumption and investment
or we can have both decisions made at the end of the period, after A
f
t is revealed. The
￿rst of these alternatives, the timing when consumption is the residual decision, is not
appealing since the optimal decision rules yield a less variable capital path which makes the
volatility of investment relative to volatility of output fall to counterfactual levels. On the
other hand, when we postpone the consumption and investment decisions to the end of the
period, the intertemporal margin is not a⁄ected by revisions. This, however, is an artifact
of the representative agent framework since when the agent receives his factor payments,
he can perfectly infer what the true productivity is. In the real world, due to idiosyncratic
uncertainty, this is not the case and thus adopting this timing would be unrealistic. The
timing we use seems more natural, since it closely resembles the process an individual agent
uses where he chooses consumption and how much to work, and adjusts his savings according
to the realization of his earnings.
One restriction of the current framework is that the uncertainty about today￿ s produc-
tivity is resolved at the end of today when output is realized. However, since the decisions
of the agents for the current period have already been made, this uncertainty will still have
welfare consequences. Modifying the model in such a way that extends the length of uncer-
tainty about today￿ s productivity would undoubtedly magnify any welfare consequences we
￿nd in this paper.
184.1.5 Optimization Problems
Firms￿Problem
Because of the CRS assumption, all the ￿rms will have zero pro￿ts, and the number of
￿rms becomes indeterminate. Therefore, without loss of generality we consider the problem
of a representative ￿rm. The ￿rm solves a static problem where it maximizes expected pro￿ts
by choosing factor demands every period. This model di⁄ers from the benchmark model in
that the ￿rm does not observe the level of true productivity before making its decisions.
Instead, like the agents, it observes the announcement of the statistical agency and obtains
^ A by running the Kalman Filter. The actual factor payments, on the other hand, depend on








; as given. The solution to the static pro￿t maximization problem implies
that the actual wage and rental payments by the ￿rm satisfy
W = exp
￿










which simply set the marginal productivity of the factors equal to their prices.
By Euler￿ s Theorem, total output is exhausted by the factor payments made to the
agents, i.e.
Y = WH + RK
Agents￿Problem
The problem that the representative agent faces is a dynamic one in which he forecasts
future prices to make his decisions. Moreover, since he does not observe the current level
of productivity, he does not know the true wage and rental payments he will receive in re-







, that depend on the unobserved Af: Following the timing conven-
tion described in Section 4.1.4, the agent￿ s consumption and labor supply decisions are made









; respectively. Since the investment decision takes place after





: Combining all these ingredients and omitting the arguments of the














subject to k0 = Wh + Rk + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ c





where he takes the prices W (:) and R(:), the law of motion for aggregate capital, and initial
capital stocks k0 and K0 as given. The expectation operator E integrates out r; r0; and "0,
given the ￿ltered signal ^ A since ￿1; ￿2 and ￿3 all depend on those three stochastic objects.13
4.2 Equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium of this economy in a standard way. First, we de￿ne a recursive
competitive equilibrium (RCE) in this economy. Next, we invoke the equivalence of the
allocations from a RCE and those from the solution to the social planner￿ s problem (SPP).
Finally, we solve the SPP to obtain the decision rules.
We can de￿ne a RCE in this economy as follows.
De￿nition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) A Recursive Competitive Equilib-


































￿ (Firms Optimize) W(:); R(:); and H (:) satisfy the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm,
(13) and (14).




solves the Bellman￿ s


















13Standard Inada conditions on u(:) guarantee that the solution to the agent￿ s problem will be interior,
and we do not explicitly put constraints on the decision rules.
20In the absence of externalities (such as consumption externalities) and frictions (such as
taxes), the allocations from the problem of the social planner, who places equal weights on
each agent, are identical to those from the RCE. As shown in Prescott and Mehra (1980),
both welfare theorems hold in the current framework, that is, all competitive equilibria
are Pareto Optimal, and all Pareto Optimal allocations can be supported as competitive
equilibria. Therefore, we can solve for the allocations of the social planner￿ s problem to
characterize the allocations in the competitive equilibrium. Note that the results in Prescott
and Mehra (1980) require that agents have rational expectations and the existence of a well-
de￿ned law of motion for the stochastic variables in the model. These conditions are satis￿ed
in our model.













subject to k0 = y + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ c
given ^ A0 = ￿ ^ A + ￿3
where the social planner maximizes the representative agent￿ s utility subject to the resource
constraint of the economy, taking as given the initial capital stock, k0.14 Combining the
￿rst order conditions and the envelope conditions from (16), we obtain the following Euler
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= u2(c;1 ￿ h) (17)
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^ A + ￿
1
￿
F (h;k) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k
0 (19)
Equations (17) and (18) di⁄er from the Euler Equations from the standard growth model
by the expectations operator in front of current period terms, on the left hand side of the
intra-temporal Euler Equation.15 This is the result of the new layer of uncertainty generated
14Strictly speaking, the functions V; c; h; and k0 in (16) are di⁄erent from those in (15). Due to the
equivalence of the allocations in the two problems, using the same function names is innocuous.
15See Appendix C.1 where we write these equations using all the arguments of the functions, which clari￿es
how the expectations are computed.
21by revisions.
We use (17), (18), and (19) for ￿nding c(:); h(:); and k (:); the decision rules of the agent.
After solving for the allocations, we use the (13) and (14) to decentralize the allocations, i.e.
to ￿nd the prices that support these allocations as a RCE.
Before turning to solving the dynamic model, we characterize the deterministic steady
state of the economy. Since the addition of revisions only changes the stochastic structure
of the model, the deterministic steady state of the model is independent of revisions and is
identical to the deterministic steady state of the benchmark model. Setting all stochastic
variables equal to their means, we obtain the following three equations which characterize
the deterministic steady state,
￿￿ k;￿ c;￿ h
￿
:






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(21)
￿ c = F
￿￿ h;￿ k
￿
￿ ￿￿ k (22)
4.3 Functional Forms and Calibration
4.3.1 Preference and Technology Parameters
In order to solve the model, we choose the following functional forms. For the instanta-
neous utility function, we use a Cobb-Douglas aggregator in a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function, given by





This utility function is commonly used in the literature since it belongs to a class of utility
functions consistent with balanced growth. With this speci￿cation the elasticity of substitu-
tion of consumption and leisure is unity, and risk aversion is characterized by the parameters
￿ and ￿.16 For the production function we use a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation
F (h;k) = sh
￿k
1￿￿ (24)
16The coe¢ cient of risk aversion with respect to consumption using the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk
aversion is 1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
22where the parameter s is a scale parameter used to normalize the steady state of capital to
unity.
We choose a quarterly frequency for our model since most of the data we used in the
￿rst part of the paper to document the properties of revisions were quarterly. Moreover, as
will be explained in detail below, the measure of the revisions to productivity we use for
calibrating the parameters for the process of rt is only available in quarterly frequency.
In the spirit of Cooley and Prescott (1995), the parameters of the model are calibrated
such that the model matches some of the long run characteristics of the US economy. We
use the following annualized calibration targets obtained from the US data for the period
1965-2000:17
￿ Steady state investment-capital ratio of 0:04:
￿ Steady state capital-output ratio of 3:55:
￿ People work for about a third of their discretionary time.
￿ Steady state real interest rate of 4%:
These targets, imposed on the steady state conditions given by (20), (21), and (22) along
with the functional forms in (23) and (24), ￿x the values of ￿;￿;￿; and ￿:18
The value of ￿ is set equal to 2; which gives a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion with
respect to consumption of 1:37.
4.3.2 Stochastic Processes
To complete the calibration process, we have to ￿x the values of the parameters that govern
the stochastic processes, ￿;￿";￿; and ￿r: For the autoregressive process governing the true
technology process, we follow King and Rebello (1999). First, using (24) we obtain a measure






















17We follow the discussion in Cooley and Prescott (1995) to have a ￿consistent set of measurements to
align the model economy with the data.￿In particular, our measure of capital stock includes private capital
stock (non-residential land, ￿xed private capital, and inventories), private durables consumption stock, and
government capital stock. We use average weekly hours worked from the Establishment Survey as a measure
of labor supply.
18Details are provided in Appendix C.2.
23where the superscript of f denotes the ￿nal value of a variable. As noted by many authors,
this measure is non-stationary as it is growing over time. The standard growth model implies
that all variables (except for hours) grow at the same constant rate on average, implying a
linear trend in logarithms. Therefore, we run an AR(1) regression on A
f
t with an additional
linear trend in the regression.19 The detrended Solow residual is shown in Figure 4.3.1, and
it is consistent with the productivity slowdown of late 1970s, the recession of early 1980s,
and the higher-than-average growth productivity in the second half of 1990s. The AR(1)











t￿1 + "t, R
2 = 0:999, ￿" = 0:0081








t) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)log(k
o
t)




























The actual US data for labor supply are based on surveys and do not get revised by






















where we express the revision to the Solow residual in terms of revisions of output and capital
relative to their initial announcements. We already have the revisions of output from our
empirical analysis. In Appendix C.2 we create the revision to capital using the perpetual
inventory method.21 The resulting revisions to the Solow residual are given in Figure 4.3.1.
19This is, of course, equivalent to detrending A
f
t using a linear trend and using the residuals from this
regression in an AR(1) regression. The detrending regression implies a annualized growth rate of 2:1%.
20By this we mean that the same survey is not repeated over the same sample in the same period. There
are, of course, di⁄erent measures of labor supply based on di⁄erent surveys. The only source of labor-based
real-time data we know is the Philadelphia Fed Real-Time Dataset￿ s unemployment rate variable. The
revisions to unemployment are very small and follow changes in seasonal weights very closely.
21While there are some signi￿cant revisions to investment, since the capital stock is much larger, the
24Table 4.3 - Calibrated Parameters
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ s ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿r
0:99 2 0:371 0:700 0:153 0:011 0:966 0:0081 0:0049 0:0074
The mean and standard deviation for the revision to the Solow residual are 0:0049 and
0:0074; respectively. Also a standard statistical test fails to reject normality for the revision
to the Solow residual, justifying our choice of the normal distribution for rt in our model.
The values of the calibrated parameters are given in the Table 4.3.
As we argued in Section 4.1.2, we can use the iid revisions in our model to analyze the ef-
fects of predictability of revisions by changing their variance. If the revisions are predictable,
then eliminating this predictability amounts to reducing the variance of the revisions, since
the predictable part will be incorporated into the announcement of the statistical agency. To
parameterize the case where revisions are not predictable, we conduct an ex-post forecasting
exercise for the Solow residual similar to the one discussed in Aruoba(2004). The forecasting
equation has an R2 of 0.14, and this yields a standard deviation for the residuals (which are
the revisions we will consider in the no predictability case) of 0:0064: The Solow residual
and its forecast from this exercise are shown in Figure 4.3.2. Since the unpredictable part
of the revisions come from the residuals of a regression, they will by de￿nition have a zero
mean. So, when we analyze the case of no predictability, we use the parameters ￿ = 0 and
￿r = 0:0064:
4.4 Solution Method
There is no known analytical solution to the problem given in (16). In order to solve for
the equilibrium, we need to approximate the solution. There are many ways of approaching
this problem, ranging from linear or higher order approximations to global solution methods,
which approximate the decision rules over the whole domain. While the solution method
used in similar studies generally depends on the tastes of the authors, sometimes, as in our
case, a certain class of solution methods is necessitated by the nature of the problem. The
goal of this paper is computing welfare consequences due to the changes in the variances
of the stochastic variables. It is well known that linear solution methods display certainty
relative importance of the revisions to capital is very small.
25equivalence, that is, the solution is independent of the variances of the stochastic variables.
This makes using linear methods for this paper unfeasible.
We choose to use the Weighted Residuals Method (or Projection Method) using Cheby-
shev Polynomials and Orthogonal Collocation to solve the functional equations (17) and
(18) in the unknown functions h(:) and c(:). Aruoba et al. (2003) ￿nd that for the bench-
mark problem in this paper, this method performs very well in terms of the size of the
approximation error. We provide the details of the process in Appendix C.4.
4.5 E⁄ects of Data Revisions on the Equilibrium
Our ￿rst step is to solve for the equilibrium in the model with revisions and compare it with
the equilibrium of the benchmark economy. In this section, we highlight the di⁄erences in
terms of the decision rules and business cycle implications. In the next section, we turn to
the question of welfare.
4.5.1 Decision Rules
In Section 3 we described the precautionary motive due to data uncertainty. In the presence
of data uncertainty, we observed that the responses of the social planner to the signals he
observes were less extreme compared to his responses under no uncertainty. This is a sign
of a precautionary motive, since the social planner considers the possibility of observing a
wrong signal when making his decisions.
We turn to exploring the e⁄ect of data uncertainty on the decision rules in this model.
Figure 4.5.1 shows the two decision rules chosen by the agent, c(:) and h(:); along with the
implied decisions for investment for the benchmark model and the model with revisions.22
Since these objects are multi-dimensional objects, we provide a cross section at k = 1, its




so that decision rules
for the two models are comparable.
Let us ￿rst focus on the decision rules of the agent in the benchmark economy. Unlike
the simple model, labor supply is positively related to the technology shock, which means
the substitution e⁄ect of higher productivity (and therefore wages) dominates the income
22Investment follows from the budget constraint (19) as i = exp(Ao + r)F (h;k) ￿ c:
26e⁄ect.23 By the same token, the consumption decision rule is also positively related to the
technology shock. The di⁄erence is due to the dynamic structure of the model and to the
existence of investment, which is the link between two periods. When the agent observes a
positive technology shock, there are two substitution e⁄ects at work. First, the intratemporal
substitution e⁄ect makes the agent work more and consume more compared to a zero shock
since a positive in technology shock makes leisure more expensive and consumption cheaper.
Second, the intertemporal substitution makes the agent work more and invest more. The
agent realizes the mean-reverting structure of the stochastic process and he knows that
tomorrow￿ s technology shock will be less than today￿ s value (in expectation). Therefore,
in order to exploit this better production opportunity he wants to work more and save for
tomorrow. Working against these substitution e⁄ects is the income e⁄ect which makes the
agent work less and consume more since he is richer with increased productivity. Clearly, for
the current parametrization of the model the two substitution e⁄ects dominate the income
e⁄ect and all three decisions are positively related to productivity.
Comparing the decision rules for the benchmark model and the model with revisions,
we can identify the e⁄ect of revisions. In the presence of revisions, the agent chooses a
labor supply schedule which is more extreme and a consumption schedule which is less
extreme than his choices in the benchmark model. These two decisions yield an investment
schedule which is more extreme. Two of these ￿ndings are in line with the intuition we
obtained in the simple model, which suggested that as a result of a precautionary motive
the agents choose less extreme decision rules when they are faced with data uncertainty and
this leads to more extreme decisions in their residual decisions. In this model the changes
in consumption and investment decisions are in line with this intuition. However, we see
that labor supply decisions become more extreme. This can be explained by the increased
e⁄ect of intertemporal substitution for low enough level of uncertainty. In other words, the
intertemporal substitution explained above becomes even stronger for low enough ￿r and
this counteracts the e⁄ects of the precautionary motive.
To understand this further, consider Figure 4.5.2 where we plot the consumption and




= 0:05 as functions of the data
uncertainty in the economy given by ￿r: First, we see that consumption decisions for any
￿r are always lower than the benchmark case and similarly the labor decisions are always
23The substitution e⁄ect was zero in the simple model.
27higher than the benchmark case. The interpretation of these results with respect to the
slopes of the decision rules in Figure 4.5.1 is that labor supply is always more extreme and
consumption is always less extreme as we increase the level of data uncertainty. Moreover,
for low levels of ￿r the di⁄erence between the benchmark and the revision models are more
extreme.
In order to explain this e⁄ect, we turn to the conditional distributions of technology shock
today and tomorrow, given the observation of the ￿ltered signal today. As we argued above,
in the benchmark model (when ￿r = 0) a positive productivity shock meant that today is
more productive than tomorrow and the agent chooses to increase his labor supply to capture





t+1 given ^ At = 0:05 for various values of ￿r: These distributions are characterized















































We see that the conditional means of the two distributions are unchanged and the conditional
variances increase as ￿r changes. For ￿r = 0; the conditional distribution of A
f
t is degenerate
at 0:05 and we see that a larger mass of the conditional distribution of A
f
t+1 lies to the left
of 0:05: As we increase ￿r; since the conditional variance of A
f
t increases much faster for
small values of ￿r; we observe a bigger mass in the conditional distribution of A
f
t compared
to the conditional distribution of A
f
t+1: This causes today look even more productive than
tomorrow and makes the labor supply decision rule steeper and consumption decision rule
less steep since the agent ￿nds it more bene￿cial to produce and save more today. As
we further increase ￿r, the two conditional distributions increase at the same rate and the
di⁄erence between today and tomorrow reduces. To sum up, due to the dynamic structure
of the model the precautionary motive is dominated by the agent￿ s concern for tomorrow
28and since due to the mean-reverting structure of the technology shock today is always better
than tomorrow in expectations he chooses a more extreme labor supply schedule and a less
extreme consumption schedule.24
4.5.2 Business Cycle Statistics
We compute some statistics to see how the business cycle dynamics are a⁄ected by the
existence of revisions. We simulate the model 100,000 times for 144 periods and obtain
the time series for some key variables. Next, we take their natural logarithm and apply
the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. We report the averages of the statistics we obtain from the
simulations along with the corresponding statistics from the US data25 for the period 1965-
2000 in Table 4.5.26
The ￿rst two columns report the volatility of the variables in level and relative to the
volatility of output. The results indicate that the volatility of output in the benchmark model
falls short of the volatility in the data by about 9%. On the other hand, output in the model
with revisions is 7% more volatile than in the benchmark model. This result suggests that
the extra uncertainty introduced by the revisions increases output volatility to a level more
consistent with the data. Both models fail to capture the consumption volatility in the data,
as the relative volatility of consumption implied by the models are about half of what the data
indicates. On the other hand, both models imply a higher relative volatility of investment
than the data, with the model with revisions generating more volatility benchmark model.
Similar to consumption, both models produce a labor supply signi￿cantly less volatile than
what the data shows. Nevertheless, labor in the model with revisions is about 40% more
volatile than in the benchmark model, which comes close to the data. Wages in both models
￿ uctuate more than what the data suggests, and there is only a small reduction in the model
with revisions. When we look at the volatility of rental rate, both models fail to capture
the volatility in the data. We can conclude that the model with revisions is no worse than
the benchmark model in matching the volatility of the data for all the variables we consider,
24All the conclusions in this argument will change directions when the observed productivity shock is
negative. This ensures the suggested changes in thes slope of the decision rules.
25See Appendix A for details about the data used in this section.
26We report the standard errors of the statistics that we compute using US data. The statistics computed
using the model are based on the means over a large number of simulations, and as such, the estimation
error of means is negligible.
29and it performs better for output and labor.
The next column reports the persistence of the variables, measured by the ￿rst order
autocorrelation coe¢ cients. All variables are persistent which follows from the persistent
structure of the stochastic technology process in the model. We see that, compared to the
data, both models produce signi￿cantly less persistent variables. Moreover, the existence of
data uncertainty lowers the persistence of consumption and labor in the model with revisions
compared to the benchmark model, since these decisions depend on the announcement rather
than the true productivity shock. The persistence of other variables remains roughly the
same.
The rest of the table reports the correlations of the variables with output in di⁄erent
leads and lags. The data shows high contemporaneous correlation and slightly less but still
signi￿cant correlation in all leads and lags except for wages and the returns on capital. The
latter variables have a weak contemporaneous correlation with output, which both models fail
to capture. The benchmark model produces variables which are almost perfectly correlated
with output contemporaneously, but this correlation dies out within a year in either direction.
The same conclusion about the leads and lags is true for the model with revisions, but the
contemporaneous correlations are less than perfect. This result is due to the existence of
a second source variation in the economy, the revisions, which a⁄ect all variables directly
except output, which is indirectly a⁄ected. This makes variables less correlated with output,
and the model with revisions comes closer to matching the data in this dimension.
Overall, the results from this section indicate that in the dimensions that the bench-
mark model fails to match the data, the model with revisions does no worse and comes
closer to matching the data in some dimensions, such as volatility of output and labor and
contemporaneous correlation of variables with output.
Before concluding this section, we want to contrast our results with those of Bom￿m
(2001), who computes the business cycle implications of a noisy indicator. His model is
very similar to Kydland and Prescott (1982) except for the strategic complementarity he
introduces in the production function. He ￿nds that the volatility of output increases when
the noise in the announcements is removed. This result is at odds with our ￿nding that
volatility of output decreases when we go from the model with revisions to the benchmark
model. While the existence of strategic complementarity in his model might be the reason
for the di⁄erence, we think the di⁄erence is mostly due to the di⁄erent calibration strategies
30Table 4.5 - Business Cycle Statistics
Volatility Relative Correlation with yt
(STD %) Volatility Persistence x(t ￿ 4) x(t ￿ 1) x(t) x(t + 1) x(t + 4)
Model with Revisions
y 1.56 1.00 0.66 0.07 0.66 1.00 0.66 0.07
c 0.54 0.34 0.48 -0.05 0.49 0.91 0.59 0.18
i 7.54 4.77 0.69 0.11 0.68 0.98 0.64 0.03
h 0.87 0.55 0.44 0.10 0.56 0.92 0.52 0.00
W 0.83 0.52 0.68 0.03 0.65 0.91 0.69 0.13
R 0.03 0.02 0.66 0.16 0.68 0.98 0.59 -0.04
Benchmark Model
y 1.46 1.00 0.70 0.08 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.08
c 0.55 0.38 0.71 -0.01 0.65 0.99 0.73 0.18
i 6.42 4.41 0.69 0.12 0.71 0.99 0.67 0.03
h 0.62 0.42 0.69 0.13 0.71 1.00 0.66 0.01
W 0.84 0.58 0.70 0.04 0.68 1.00 0.71 0.12


































































































Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
31and solution methods employed in the two papers.
4.6 Welfare Consequences of Data Revisions
In the previous section, we showed that the decision rules of the agents and business cycle
dynamics implied by the model change, in some cases signi￿cantly, with the introduction of
revisions. However, we still do not have a measure of how important these changes are. In
this section we turn to this question and compute the welfare consequences of revisions.
4.6.1 Measuring Welfare
The value function de￿ned in (15) measures the lifetime expected utility of the agent. It is,
therefore, reasonable to use it to compare the welfare of two agents in two di⁄erent economies,
which di⁄er by the properties of revisions. However, this value function conditions on the
￿ltered signal, ^ At; instead of true shock, A
f
t: As we show in Section 3.3 for the static model,
using the value function of the agent may be problematic since it might give a higher expected
utility than the benchmark (no uncertainty) model in some observed states of the world. This
may happen in some bad states of the world, where the agent considers the small possibility
that the true state of the world is actually good. Due to the concavity of the utility function,
this optimism may increase the expected utility of the agent over and above the utility that
an agent, who knows with certainty that the state of the world is bad, enjoys.
In this paper we use a welfare measure that depends only on the true states of the world.
We ￿nd this measure more appealing since only what the agents can do, as opposed to what
they dream they could do, a⁄ect welfare. We de￿ne a new value function where we use the































































32where the expectations are taken with respect to ^ At; conditioning on A
f
t:27 The ￿rst term
in (26) evaluates the instantaneous utility at all possible realizations of the announcement,
^ At; given A
f
t; and the second term gives the expected continuation value where all possible
values of both ^ At (for getting kt+1) and A
f
t+1 are considered. We solve for the function ^ V (:)
by applying the Chebyshev approximation method to the Bellman￿ s equation (26).28











with respect to ^ At becomes trivial. In other words, the new value function is identical to
the objective function of the agent in the benchmark economy. We can, therefore, interpret
^ V (:) in general as evaluating the decisions of the agent in the model with revisions, in
the objective function of an agent in the benchmark economy. This insight facilitates the
comparison of the welfare in the benchmark economy and the model with revisions. In what
follows, we denote the value of the benchmark economy by V B (:) and the value of the model
with revisions by ^ V R (:):
We can state the following proposition, which is similar to Proposition 1 in Section 3.3.












for all kt and A
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A sketch of the proof is in Appendix C.3. This proposition is an implication of Blackwell￿ s
(1951, 1953) well-known theorem, which states that an information set is more informative
than another if and only if all expected utility maximizers prefer to observe the former. In our
case, the benchmark economy contains more information than the economy with revisions.
Except for the information structure, the two economies are identical. In particular, the agent
in the benchmark economy can choose to mimic the agent in the economy with revisions by
using his decision rules. This will be trivially feasible for him. Since he doesn￿ t choose to
do so, his welfare cannot be worse than the welfare of the agent in the model with revisions.
Note that the de￿nition of ^ V (:) and its interpretation as the objective function of an agent
in the benchmark economy is crucial for this theorem.
Since comparing value functions, whose units are utils, is not very informative, we use
the consumption equivalent variation measure. This measure asks the question, ￿How much
27We multiply instantaneous utility with (1 ￿ ￿) so that the value function has the same units as the
utility function u(:):
28As we show in Appendix C.4.2, the problem is reduced to solving a system of linear equations.
33more consumption at every period and in all states of the world would one need to give
the agent in one economy to make him as well o⁄ as the agent in the other economy?￿The
answer to the question is a fraction of per-period consumption and can be easily interpreted.
Using the utility function in (23) and the convention that the model with revisions is
the ￿bad￿economy, the welfare loss, expressed in terms of consumption, of going from the
benchmark economy with initial states SB






















In addition to this state-contingent measure, we de￿ne an ex-ante measure of welfare.
Instead of choosing which state the agents will start their life in, we average over all possible
states using the ergodic distribution of the states of each economy. This can be interpreted
as the ex-ante value of being in a certain economy at time t = ￿1; that is, before the initial
state is realized. This allows us to evaluate welfare behind Rawls￿veil of ignorance. We





















0) is the ergodic distribution of initial states and Si is the set of all possible states.









Finally, we also use a maximin or Rawlsian measure of welfare, which considers the worst
































Welfare Cost of Data Uncertainty
Before turning to the results, we want to explain the source of the welfare losses we
document in this section. The agents are a⁄ected by the data uncertainty on two levels. First,
their intra-temporal margin is a⁄ected since their consumption and labor supply decisions are
not optimal responses to the true productivity shock. Second, their inter-temporal margin
is a⁄ected. Since the investment decision is not an independent decision and follows from
the budget constraint, the agent cannot change his decision even though he observes the
true productivity shock before investment takes place. This makes the capital stock that the
agent starts the next period with suboptimal compared to the capital stock of an agent who
does not face data uncertainty.
Our ￿rst task it to assess the welfare consequences of data uncertainty, that is, the
welfare loss due to the existence of revisions, using di⁄erent measures of welfare. This
amounts to comparing the model with revisions, with the calibrated values for ￿r and ￿;
to the benchmark economy. We report the results in Table 4.6.1. The ￿rst row reports the
welfare loss when we consider both economies starting at the deterministic steady state of
capital and the unconditional mean for the technology shock. In this case, the welfare loss
is computed to be 0.62% of consumption every period. The other two measures, the ex-ante
measure and the Rawlsian measure, give similar answers.
The next obvious step is to ask the question, ￿What can be done to reduce this welfare
loss?￿ . We cannot talk about eliminating this loss completely since, due to the timeliness-
accuracy trade-o⁄ that they face, the statistical agencies will always make data announce-
ments which are later revised due to the arrival of new information. In other words, we must
accept living with some level of data uncertainty.




Benchmark 0:0000 0:0000 0:00
Calibrated Revisions 0:0049 0:0074 0:47
No Predictability 0:0000 0:0064 0:39
No Announcements 0:0000 0:0081 0:50
One possible way of reducing data uncertainty is to take into account the predictability
of revisions. In the version of the model described above, the agents treat the revisions in the
economy as iid and do not try to forecast revisions. This setup was justi￿ed by the evidence
from the SPF. As argued in Section 4.1.2, eliminating the predictability of data revisions
is equivalent to reducing the variance of the iid revisions in our model. We compute the
properties of the revisions in the no-predictability economy in Section 4.3.2 as ￿ = 0 and
￿r = 0:0064: We repeat the welfare loss computations for this parameterization. The results
are reported on the third line of Table 4.6.2 using the ex-ante welfare measure, which also
contains the parameter values and welfare measures for the benchmark and the calibrated
model. The results show that the welfare loss with this parametrization is 0:39% of consump-
tion every period, which is about 0:08% less than the case when revisions are predictable.
This means the agents would enjoy a welfare increase equivalent to a 0.08% increase in con-
sumption every period if the predictability of revisions are reduced or, alternatively, if they
use a forecasting equation such as the one in Aruoba (2004) to forecast the revisions.
The ￿nal exercise we conduct determines the bene￿t of having announcements by asking
the question ￿What happens when we eliminate the statistical agency?￿ . As we argued in









t￿1; i.e., ￿r = ￿": The welfare loss in this parameterization is 0.50%
of consumption every period, which is about 0:03% more than the loss using the calibrated
parameters. We interpret this di⁄erence as the welfare gain due to having announcements.
Obviously this gain is larger if the data produced by the statistical agency is not predictable.
In the next section, we put the results in Table 4.6.2 into perspective by comparing our
results with some of the other results in the literature and conducting a cost-bene￿t analysis






for data collection. We close this section by investigating the robustness of our results with
respect to parameter uncertainty.
Sensitivity Analysis
We now turn to analyzing the sensitivity of our welfare results to changes in parameters.
To that end, we use a Monte Carlo framework similar to the one in Canova (1994). It is a
common practice in the literature to consider changing the parameter values to analyze the
robustness of the results. This is important for two reasons. First, one can be interested in
the contribution of a particular variable to the results. Second, and more importantly, since
the calibration targets are often based on estimates, they carry some estimation error and this
must be re￿ ected in the results. Canova (1994) suggests a framework which makes the latter
point more formal. In particular, in his framework, the researcher chooses distributions for
the parameters in the model and solves the model many times for di⁄erent parametrizations.
This yields a distribution for the object of interest instead of a single number. By looking
at the width of the distribution one can judge the sensitivity of the results.
Canova (1994) argues that the uncertainty in the parameters that drive the exogenous
processes in the models are more important in terms of changing the results compared to the
deep parameters, the parameters of the utility function and production function.29 Following
this insight, we conduct a Monte Carlo experiment where we ￿x the values of the deep
parameters to those in Table 4.3 but vary the parameters ￿;￿"; and ￿r: As ￿ is close to one,
the results are very sensitive to small changes. Therefore, instead of choosing a distribution
for ￿; we vary ￿A = ￿" p
1￿￿2 and ￿" and let ￿ adjust accordingly. For simplicity we choose a
uniform distribution for the parameters ￿A; ￿"; and ￿r based on the 99% con￿dence intervals
29This can also be justi￿ed on the grounds that the deep parameters are calibrated using long-run averages
which have small standard errors due to the length of the sample.
37of the estimated parameters.30 The ranges for the three standard deviation parameters and
the implied range for ￿ is reported in Table 4.6.3 along with the parameters used for obtaining
the results reported in this paper.
The kernel density of the distribution of the welfare loss measures obtained in this exercise
is given in Figure 4.6. The thick vertical lines show the minimum and maximum values of
welfare we found in the simulation and the dashed vertical lines show the 10- and 90-percentile
of the empirical distribution that underlies this kernel density. We see that the distribution
is roughly centered around the number we report in Table 4.6.1, 0.47. Even though the
variance of the distribution is quite high, the distribution is bounded away from zero, which
means that regardless of the parameter values we choose, there is a non-negligible welfare
loss due to data uncertainty.
4.6.3 Discussion of the Results
One of the obvious benchmarks to which we can compare our results is the literature on
welfare costs of business cycles. The seminal work of Lucas (1987) considers a simple model
with no labor and capital and computes the welfare gains of replacing a variable consump-
tion stream with its mean. This exercise yields a welfare improvement of about 0:05% of
consumption, using parameters that roughly correspond to the post-war US economy. There
have been many di⁄erent approaches to computing the welfare cost of business cycles, from
using heterogeneous agent models to using the implications from ￿nancial markets.31 The
results from these approaches put the welfare cost of business cycles at roughly 0.1% of
consumption.
A recent paper by Cho and Cooley (2003) argues that most of these estimates are biased,
potentially very seriously so. They use a representative agent model very similar to the
benchmark model in this paper and show that for a wide range of parametrizations (which











where s is the estimate of the standard deviation and n is the sample size. Since the distributions of standard
errors are Chi-squared, the end-points of the con￿dence intervals are not symmetric around the estimate.
31Lucas (2003) provides an overview of some of these results.
38Table 4.6.4 - Summary of Welfare Results
Welfare
Fraction of Consumption Monetary Value (in billion $)
Cost of Data Uncertainty 0.47% 32.8
Cost of Predictability 0.08% 5.1
Value of Announcements 0.03% 2.3
includes the parameterization in this paper) business cycles can be welfare-improving.32
This result is very puzzling if not counterintuitive. Economic theory suggests that risk-
averse agents prefer lower risk and they prefer a less variable consumption stream, which
would be the result of less severe business cycles. This intuition holds true in the Lucas
(1987) economy since the agent simply consumes all output without making any choices.
The critical di⁄erence in Cho and Cooley (2003) and all models with endogenous labor is
that the agents have extra margins to react when faced with variable technological progress,
in this case labor and investment. The agents may take advantage of high productivity by
working and investing more (and vice versa for lower productivity), and this may increase
the mean of output and, therefore, the mean of consumption. While a higher variance (more
severe business cycles) will lead to a welfare reduction in the Lucas sense, a higher expected
consumption will lead to a welfare improvement. We consider the results from Cho and
Cooley (2003) to be evidence that comparisons of our welfare results to the welfare cost of
business cycles is not appropriate.
Finally, we turn to the idea of Sims (1985) and conduct a cost-bene￿t analysis of data
collection. Table 4.6.4 shows several welfare measures along with their approximate monetary
value.33 The ￿rst row in Table 4.6.4 shows the welfare loss due to data uncertainty which is
0.47% of consumption or $32:8 billion in annual terms. Of course, there is nothing we can do
about most of this loss since, due to the tension between timeliness and accuracy, we should
be willing to accept some revisions. The next row shows the loss due to the predictability
of revisions which is 0:08% of consumption, about $5:1 billion. This means if the statistical
agency starts to produce announcements which result in unpredictable revisions, or if the
32The parameter restriction they obtain for business cycles to be welfare improving is ￿ < 3:9. All the
other parameters in their calibration are close to the ones in this paper.
33We use annual consumption of $7 trillion to compute the monetary values.
39agents in the economy start exploiting the predictability of revisions, the gain will be about
$5:1 billion more consumption per year. This means that about a quarter of the loss due
to data uncertainty can be recovered by making changes in how data is collected by the
statistical agency or processed by private agents. The last row of the table suggests that
when we compare the present situation to a case where there are no announcements, the
value of the statistical agency is 0:03% of consumption or about $2:3 billion.
We can summarize our statements above as follows:
￿ The loss due to data uncertainty is $33 billion, and it can be reduced by $5 billion if
the statistical agency produces unbiased announcements and unpredictable revisions.
￿ The current state of data collection is worth $2:3 billion.
These numbers correspond to the bene￿t part of a cost-bene￿t analysis. In the framework
of our model, we are able to quantify the gains from data collection ($2.3 billion) and able to
make a policy proposal which will produce an additional gain of $5.1 billion. The cost side
of the analysis, however, is not straightforward. The cost counterpart of our measure of the
bene￿t of data collection is obviously the cost of the statistical agencies that produce the
data, measured by their budget allocations. However, the ￿rst number is the bene￿t from a
hypothetical policy whose cost is virtually impossible to measure. Moreover, we do not have
a clear understanding as to why the revisions are predictable. They may be the results of
an optimization problem that the statistical agency solves using a particular loss function.
Nevertheless, we believe that the current budget numbers can be of some guidance for this
comparison as well.
The FY2004 budget allocates $78 million to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, $662 to
the Census Bureau, and $512 million to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.34 Of the 11 major
statistical agencies in the US, these three are the biggest ones with a total budget of $1:3
billion. Also, we use the aggregate data from two of these agencies, BEA and BLS, to
compute the revisions to the Solow residual, with the Census Bureau providing some of the
micro data underlying the macro aggregates. Clearly this amount is an over-estimate of the
cost of producing the relevant aggregates that we use for the Solow residual as these agencies
produce hundreds of other data products.
34Sources: Various government internet sites.
40The bene￿t of data announcements, computed using our model, is about twice the overall
cost of the statistical agencies. On the other hand, the bene￿t of having unpredictable
revisions is about four times the budget of the statistical agencies, which means any money
spent towards correcting the predictability of revisions we discussed in this paper would be
well worth it.
415 Conclusions
Using recent empirical results regarding the statistical properties of macroeconomic data
revisions as the motivation, we analyze the e⁄ects of revisions in a general equilibrium
framework. We build a variant of the neoclassical growth model where the agents have to
make their decisions observing only a signal about the true level of current productivity
instead of the true level itself. This information structure induces the agents to change
their behavior, in important ways along some dimensions. We ￿nd that the presence of
data uncertainty creates a precautionary motive where the agents respond to signals of the
productivity shock in less extreme fashion when making consumption decisions. This motive
also induces the agents to save more when faced with a positive shock. We also ￿nd that, due
to a more volatile capital stock, all variables in the economy are more volatile. This increase
in volatility is as high as 25% in the case of labor supply. We also document important
changes in the basic business cycle dynamics. In the presence of data uncertainty, the
volatility of output increases by about 8%, and investment and hours become more volatile
compared to output. Moreover, we ￿nd that the model with revisions performs no worse
than the benchmark model in dimensions that this class of models are weak in, and comes
closer to matching the data in some dimensions, such as volatility of output and labor, and
contemporaneous correlation of variables with output.
We also conduct a cost-bene￿t analysis for data collection, overcoming the di¢ culties
described by Sims (1985) by using our model to measure the bene￿ts of data collection. We
￿nd that around 0.47% of consumption is lost because of data uncertainty, which is equivalent
to about $33 billion every year. Moreover, a change in the data collection technology, which
would lead to unpredictable revisions, would result in a welfare improvement of 0.08% of
consumption, around $5 billion. Although we cannot compute the cost of such a policy,
since the bene￿t is four times the cost of most data production in the US, we conclude that
any money spent towards reducing the predictability of revisions would be well worth it. We
also ￿nd that the bene￿t of having data announcements is about 0.03% of consumption, or
roughly $2.3 billion every year. This is about twice the total annual budgets of the major
statistical agencies in the United States.
Our results indicate that data revisions are not only large in a statistical sense, they are
also important in an economic sense since they have sizable welfare consequences.
42Appendix
A Data Sources
In Section 4.3, we use average weekly hours from the Establishment Survey as a measure
of labor supply and real output from the Real-Time Data Set as a measure of output. The
measure of capital stock includes private capital stock (non-residential land, ￿xed private
capital and inventories), private durables consumption stock and government capital stock.
The revisions to investment that is used to compute the revisions to capital stock and
revisions to output are derived from the Real-Time Data Set.
In Section 4.5.2, variables are de￿ned as follows:
￿ Output: Real GDP.
￿ Consumption: Non-durable consumption plus services consumption.
￿ Investment: Private ￿xed investment expenditures plus durable goods consumption.
￿ Hours: Total nonfarm employment.
￿ Wages: Average hourly earnings, de￿ ated by GDP de￿ ator.
￿ Rental Rate: Real return to capital, computed along the lines of Cooley and Prescott
(1995).
B Details about the Static Model
B.1 The Optimization Problem
In this section, we provide the details about the optimization problem when p < 1 given by
(6) and (7): All the results extend to the case when p = 1; by imposing this condition on the
equations.
43To solve this problem we consider two cases. If the agent observes Ao = d: Then the ￿rst















where hH is the labor supply decision when the signal is high. (29) is a quadratic equation
in hH and can be simpli￿ed to
￿2h
2
H ￿ (d ￿ 1 ￿ 2pd)hH + d
2 ￿ 2pd + d = 0















The second order condition from (6) is
￿4hH ￿ (d ￿ 1 ￿ 2pd) < 0
and it reduces to
￿
p
6d ￿ 12dp + 9d2 ￿ 4d2p + 4d2p2 + 1 > 0






























which can be simpli￿ed as
￿2h
2
L + (d + 1 ￿ 2pd)hL + d
2 + 2pd ￿ d = 0











￿6d + 12dp + 9d2 ￿ 4d2p + 4d2p2 + 1 +
1
4
The second order condition of this problem is




￿6d + 12dp + 9d2 ￿ 4d2p + 4d2p2 + 1 > 0















Note that the solutions for hH and hL satisfy the condition h 2 (d;1] which guarantees
a positive consumption.
B.2 Proofs of Claims and Propositions35
B.2.1 Claim 1
We ￿rst show analytically that hR (d) < hR (￿d): Comparing hL and hH from (32) and (31),
we see that









6d ￿ 12dp + 9d2 ￿ 4d2p + 4d2p2 + 1 +
1
2
￿ d > 0
which imply hL > hH. The inequality in (33) holds unambiguously for all parameter values
d and p but this may not be clear due to the last term. In particular, 1=2 ￿ d is negative
when d 2 (0:5;1): Using the following steps, we can verify analytically that the inequality
holds:
35All claims and propositions in this section are also veri￿ed numerically, using a very ￿ne grid of d 2 (0;1)
and p 2 (0:5;1):
45￿ At d = 0:5; hL ￿ hH > 0 holds.
￿ The terms in square roots are monotonically increasing in d for d 2 (0:5;1):
￿ As d ! 1; hL ￿ hH > 0 holds.
We verify the second part of the claim numerically.
B.2.2 Claim 2
The ￿rst part of the claim follows from the ordering of the decision rules given by
h
B (d) < h
R (d) < h
R (￿d) < h
B (￿d)
which shows that the two decisions under uncertainty are less extreme than the decisions
under certainty.
When we compute realized consumptions for the two economies we get
c
R (d;￿d) < c
R (￿d;￿d) < c
B (￿d) < c
B (d) < c




￿ Af + hR (Ao) and cB (Ao) ￿ Ao + hB (Ao): We prove this ordering by
pairwise:
￿ cR (d;￿d) = ￿d + hR (d) < ￿d + hR (￿d) = cR (￿d;￿d) since hR (d) < hR (￿d) from
Claim 1.
￿ cR (￿d;￿d) = ￿d+hR (￿d) < ￿d+hB (￿d) = cB (￿d) since hR (￿d) < hB (￿d) from
Claim 1.
￿ cB (￿d) = 1￿d
2 < 1+d
2 = cB (d) which follows directly from (5).
￿ cB (d) = d + hB (d) < d + hR (d) = cR (d;d) since hB (d) < hR (d) from Claim 1.
￿ cR (d;d) = d+hR (d) < d+hR (￿d) = cR (￿d;d) since hR (d) < hR (￿d) from Claim 1.
46B.2.3 Claim 3
V (:) has two parts, one coming from the expected utility of consumption and the other
coming from the disutility of labor. As we have argued in Claim 1 above, the labor supply





















which are in line with the ordering in Claim 3. Given the ordering of consumption levels in













due to the concavity of the utility function.36 Similarly, when Ao = ￿d; the expected utility












for su¢ ciently low p.
These arguments show that when p is su¢ ciently low, the ordering in the statement of
the claim holds unambiguously. Our numerical results show that the ordering holds for all
p and d values.
B.2.4 Proposition 1
When p = 1; ^ V R ￿
Af￿
is by de￿nition equal to V B ￿
Af￿
: Suppose p < 1: We want to show
that V B ￿
Af￿
> ^ V R ￿
Af￿
for all Af: In words, this implies that the agent who observes the
announcements and conditions his decisions on them must be strictly worse o⁄ than the
agent who observes the true productivity. We can rewrite the objective function of the agent
































+ log[1 ￿ h]
￿
36That is, when the observed shock is low, the remote chance that the true productivity is high makes
expected utility higher, compared to knowing the (low) state of the world with certainty.







































where, as we showed above, cB (:) and hB (:) are the unique functions that maximize V B ￿
Af￿
:
The agent in the benchmark economy can also observe the announcements and may choose
to condition his decisions on them. In other words, he may choose to use the decision rules
of the agent in the revision economy, hR (:) and cR (:): Since there is a trivial resource con-
straint, these decisions are feasible for the agent in the benchmark economy. If we plug in





































which is by de￿nition equal to ^ V R ￿
Af￿
: Since V B ￿
Af￿
is the unique maximum, it must be
the case that V B ￿
Af￿
> ^ V R ￿
Af￿
:
C Details about the Dynamic Model
C.1 Euler Equations
















































































































































is the conditional distribution of r given ^ A which is given by
rj ^ A ￿ N
￿
~ ￿; ~ ￿
2￿
where ~ ￿ and ~ ￿2 follow from the conditional expectation rules for bivariate normal variables.








































+ (1 ￿ ￿) (37)
￿ c = s￿ h
￿￿ k
1￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ k (38)
We have ￿ve calibration targets to match and ￿ve parameters to choose, ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿ and s:
49Two of these targets can be imposed without reference to the steady state conditions above:
￿ Steady state real interest rate of 4% imply that ￿ = (1 + 0:4)
￿ 1
4 = 0:99
￿ Steady state annual investment-capital ratio of 0:04 imply that ￿ = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ 0:04)
1
4 =
0:011; since the steady state investment capital ratio is ￿:
We can write (37) as
1
￿




+ (1 ￿ ￿)




: Our third calibration target sets the annual capital-output ratio
to 3:55; which gives ￿ = 0:700:
We impose ￿ k = 1 as a normalization and solve (37) for s and ￿nd s = 0:153: Finally
we impose ￿ h = 0:33 following the observation that people work for about a third of their
discretionary time. Substituting (38) in to (36) we can solve for ￿ = 0:371:
In the main text, we did not discuss how we derive the revisions to capital using the
perpetual investment method. Here, we give the details of this process. We can write the



























t￿s denote di⁄erent observations of investment at date t ￿ s, ￿ is the
depreciation rate and k0 is the capital stock at date zero. We can de￿ne the kth revision to
























by using the real-time data set we described in Appendix
A. In the empirical application we assumed that rk
0 = 0; which capital at date zero is
perfectly observed. By using this assumption, we can measure the revisions in capital,
without measuring capital.
50C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.2.4. We will provide
only a sketch of the proof here since the full proof will require working with sequences, which
in turn introduce some additional notation. The steps of the proof are as follows:
￿ The value function of the social planner in the benchmark economy can be de￿ned in














tu(ct;1 ￿ ht) (39)
subject to the resource constraint
ct = yt + (1 ￿ ￿)kt ￿ kt+1 (40)




















which can be obtained by using the decision rules cB (:); hB (:) and kB (:).
These sequences, by de￿nition, obey the resource constraint (40).
￿ We can rewrite this value function by adding trivial integrals with respect to frtg since
nothing depends on revisions. When we rewrite the problem with revisions, we allow
the agent to observe revisions (and therefore Ao








are the optimal sequences for the model with revisions
which can be obtained by using the decision rules cR (:); hR (:) and kR (:): These
sequences obey the resource constraint (40) and therefore they are feasible for the



























: Note that integration is with respect to Ao,
given Af: As such, the quantity in (41) ia not the expected lifetime utility of the agent
51in the revision economy since that expectation would condition on the announcement.



























































The decision rules c(:) and h(:) are solutions to the two functional equations (17) and 18).
The value function ^ V (:) is the solution to the functional equation given by 26. In other
words all unknown objects in this paper will be the solutions to a functional equation, or
a system of functional equations. In this section, we summarize how our solution method
works for a generic problem.
Let F [g (x)] = 0 denote a functional equation where the unknown function is g (x): We
approximate the unknown function by




where f i (:)g are basis functions, which are ￿ exible functions whose linear combination can
take many di⁄erent shapes and ￿ is a set of n weights of these basis functions. We de￿ne
the residual from this approximation by
R(x;￿) = F [~ g (x;￿)]
The Weighted Residual Method37 solve for the weights by setting a weighted average of
the residual function equal to zero, in other words, theta is given by
Z
R(x;￿)￿i (x)dx = 0, i = 1;:::;n
37For more details about this and other methods for solving functional equations, see Judd (1998).
52where f￿ig are a set of weighting functions. Clearly, the in￿nite dimensional problem of
solving for g (x) is reduced to solving n equations in n unknowns.
In this paper, we choose Chebyshev Polynomials as the basis functions f ig; and choose
f￿i (x)g to be Dirac delta functions ￿i (x) = ￿ (x ￿ xi) where the points fxig are the roots
of the nth order Chebyshev Polynomial. These choices are collectively called Orthogonal
Collocation. The system of equations that needs to be solved reduce to
R(xi;￿) = 0, i;j = 1;:::;n (42)
which amounts to picking weights ￿ such that at the collocation points the approximation
is exact. Chebyshev Interpolation Theorem (see, for example, Judd, 1992) states that as n
increases, the approximation given by ~ g (x;￿) becomes arbitrarily close to the true g (x):
For evaluating the integrals in the Euler Equations (17) and (18) and the Bellman￿ s
equation (26), we use Gauss-Hermite integration. We choose the collocation points for Ao
such that the ￿rst two moments of Af and the mean of r match the implied moments in the
approximated economy.
C.4.2 Finding ^ V (:) by Chebyshev Approximation
As shown in (42), approximating an unknown function g (:) using Chebyshev approximation
amounts to solving n equation in n unknowns. These equations are potentially non-linear
equations. While there are some methods to reduce the non-linearity of these equations, for
approximating value functions, the equations turn out to be linear.












￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Eu[c(:);1 ￿ h(:)] ￿ ￿EV [k
0 (:);A
0] = 0 (43)
where c(:); h(:) and k0 (:) are appropriate decision rules and E operator integrates out all


















































= (1 ￿ ￿)Eu[c(:);1 ￿ h(:)] (44)



























Note that this result is valid for any Bellman￿ s equation and is not speci￿c for ^ V (:):
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 Figure 2.4.5.1 – Decision Rules for the Benchmark Model and 
the Model with Revisions 
 

























Note: This figure plots a cross-section of the decision rules at  1 = k . 
 
 Figure 2.4.5.2 – Consumption and Labor Supply at  1 = k  and 
( ) 05 . 0 ˆ ˆ = − t t A E A   
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 2.4.6 – Distribution of Welfare Loss Measures 
 










Notes: The two thick vertical lines show the minimum and maximum point of the 
empirical distribution from the simulation. The dashed lines show the 10- and 90-
percentile of the empirical distribution. 